

through the faith of Christ, the order of justice is not abolished but strengthened. Now the order of justice calls for inferiors to obey their superiors; otherwise it would be impossible to maintain stability in human affairs. Thus, their faith in Christ does not exempt the faithful from the duty to obey civil authority.

1. As said above, the subjection whereby one person is under another's power applies to the body not the soul, which remains free. In this life we are free through Christ's grace from ills of soul but not from those of the body, as is clear from the Apostle who said about himself in Romans that his mind served the law of God, but his body the law of sin. Therefore, those who through grace have been made children of God are free from the spiritual slavery of sin, but not from the bodily service where they are said to be bound to temporal rulers, as the Gloss says on 1 Timothy: 'Whosoever are servants under the yoke', etc.

2. The old law, as the symbol of the New Testament, had to pass away with the coming of the reality it prefigured. This is not the same for human laws that subject a person to the authority of others. Note also that it is from divine law itself that one person is held to obey another.

3. The obligation to obey secular authority is measured by what the order of justice requires. For this reason when any regime holds its power not by right but by usurpation, or commands what is wrong, subjects have no duty to obey, except for such extraneous reasons as avoidance of scandal or danger. Where scandal or danger would be involved, subjects are still not held to obey, since unjust commands have no moral standing; rather subjects should observe charity, a higher justice or some other virtue to restrain themselves from outright disobedience.

## COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS

### PROLOGUE

1. Just as the Philosopher teaches in Book 2 of the *Physics*, art imitates nature. The reason for this is that just as principles amongst themselves stand in proportionate relation to one another, so do operations and effects. Now, the principle of those things which come into being through art is the human intellect, which is derived in compliance with a certain similarity from the divine intellect, which is the principle of natural things. For this reason, it is necessary that the operations of art should imitate the operations of nature; and the things which exist through art should imitate the things which exist in nature. For if an instructor of some art were to accomplish a work of art, it is proper that the disciple who receives the art from the teacher pay attention to that work so that the student might perform in the same way. And likewise, the human intellect, the light of whose intelligence is derived from the divine intellect, must be informed by the examination of things which are made through nature, so that it should operate similarly.

2. And from the foregoing, the Philosopher says that if art were to create the works of nature, it would operate the same as nature: and conversely, if nature were to create works of art, it would make them in the same way that art does. But nature, indeed, does not accomplish works of art, but only prepares certain principles and, in a way, supplies artists with a model by which they may operate. Although art is able to inspect the works of nature, and use them in order that its own work be perfected, still it cannot be perfect. From this it is clear that human reason is only able to know the things that exist through nature: however, it both knows and creates the things which exist according to art. For this reason, it is necessary that the branches of human knowledge which concern natural things be speculative, whereas those sciences which concern the things made by humans are practical or operative on account of the imitation of nature.

3. Now nature in its own operation proceeds from the simple to the compound, so that in the things which come into being through the operation of nature, that which is of the greatest complexity is perfect and complete and the end of other things, just as is apparent in every totality with respect to its own parts. For this reason, human reason, operating from the simple to the compound, proceeds in this manner from the imperfect to perfect.

4. However, since human reason has to arrange not only the things which come into the use of human beings but also humans themselves, who are ruled by reason, it proceeds in either instance from the simple to the complex: in the case of things which enter into the use of human beings, as when someone constructs a ship out of wood and a house out of wood and stone; and in the case of human beings themselves, as when it orders many people into a certain single community. Indeed, among communities, since there are different degrees and orderings, the highest community is the city, which is ordered to the satisfaction of the needs of human life. For this reason, among all human communities, the city is most perfect. And because the things which come into the use of humans are ordered to humans as to their end, it is therefore necessary that the whole which constitutes the city is the principle of all other wholes which can be known and constituted by human reason.

5. From what has been said about the political teachings which Aristotle delivers in this book, we are able to understand four points.

The first is the necessity of this branch of knowledge. For to be able to know all that is rational, it is necessary to teach something about the perfection of human wisdom, which is called philosophy. Since, then, that whole which constitutes the city is subject to certain judgements of reason, it has been necessary for the completion of philosophy to institute learning with regard to the city, which is called 'politics' or 'civil science'.

6. Second, we can perceive the genus of this branch of knowledge. For, since practical knowledge is distinguished from speculative knowledge, in that speculative fields of knowledge are ordered only to the knowledge of truth, whereas practical fields are ordered to some work, so it is necessary

that this branch of knowledge be included within the realm of practical philosophy, since the city is a certain whole, which is not only known by human reason but is also produced thereby.

And furthermore, reason is engaged with certain things by way of making, in which the operation crosses over into external matter, which pertains properly to the arts which are called 'mechanical', analogous to that of the craftsman and the ship builder and the like; by contrast, other things should be performed by way of an action in which the operation remains within the persons who acts, just as when one deliberates, chooses, wills and attends to the other acts pertaining to moral science. It is clear that political science, which is concerned with the ordering of human beings, is not included under the science of making, which encompasses the mechanical arts, but under the science of action, which comprises the moral sciences.

7. Third, we can perceive the dignity and order of political science in relation to all other practical sciences. For the city is the most important of the things which can be constituted by human reason. For all forms of human community are directed to it.

Furthermore, all the wholes which are constituted by the mechanical arts out of the things that come into human use are ordered to people as to their end. If, therefore, the most important branch of knowledge is the one that is concerned with what is most noble and perfect, it is necessary that of all the practical fields of knowledge, political science is the most important and the architectonic of all the branches of learning, inasmuch as it is concerned with the highest and perfect good in human affairs. And on account of this the Philosopher says at the end of Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the philosophy which pertains to human affairs is perfected in politics.

8. Fourth, from what has been said, we can learn the mode and order of this branch of knowledge. For just as the speculative fields of knowledge, which examine some whole, bring about a knowledge of the whole out of consideration of its parts and its principles by revealing all its properties and operations, so that science which examines the principles and parts of the city passes on a knowledge of the city by revealing its parts and properties and operations; and because it is a practical science, it reveals in addition how each thing is able to be accomplished, which is necessary in every practical branch of knowledge.

#### BOOK 1, LESSON 1

11. ...A community is a certain whole but in all wholes is found an order such that the whole which includes within itself another whole be the highest whole; for example, a wall is a whole, and because it is included in that whole which is a house, it is clear that the house is the highest whole. And similarly, the community which includes other communities is the higher one. Now, it is clear that the city includes all other communities. For

households and villages are both united under the city, and so political community itself is the highest community. Therefore, it seeks the highest goods among all human goods: for it is directed towards the common good, which is better and more divine than the good of one individual, as is stated at the beginning of the *Ethics*.

12. He compares the city to these other societies, in which respect he makes three points. First, he lays out the false opinion of certain individuals. Second, he shows how the falsity of the stated opinion can become known. Third, according to the method indicated, he lays out the true relationship between the city and other communities.

13. Concerning the first point, it should be considered that there are two forms of community known to all, namely, the city and the household.

Now, the city is governed by a two-fold rule, namely, the political and the royal. For there is royal rule when the one who presides over the city has full power. However, there is political rule when the one who presides over the city has power restricted according to certain laws of the city.

Similarly, the household has a two-fold rule, namely, the domestic and the despotic. For everyone who has slaves is called a despot. But the procurator or superintendent of any family is called a domestic head. For this reason, despotic rule is that by which a master commands slaves, but domestic rule is that by which one dispenses the things that pertain to the whole family, in which are contained not only slaves but also many free people. Therefore, some people have maintained – but not correctly – that these particular forms of rule do not differ but are entirely the same.

14. He sets forth their rationale for this, which is as follows. The things that differ only by reason of large and small numbers do not differ specifically, because a difference according to more or less does not distinguish a species. But the rules just mentioned differ only by reason of large or small numbers, a claim which they defend as follows.

For if the community that is ruled contains a small number of people, as in the case of some small household, he who presides over them is called the head of household, to whom pertains despotic rule.

However, if the community is made up of a large number of people, so that it contains not only slaves but also a large number of free persons, the one who commands them is called the domestic head.

But if the community is made up of an even greater number of people, for example, not only those who are one household, but those who are of one city, then the rule is said to be political or royal.

15. The falsity of what certain people have said, insofar as they hold that the household and the city differ only by reason of their smallness and greatness, so that a large household is a small city and vice versa, will become clear from the following. Likewise, they have also maintained that political and royal rule differ only by reason of larger and smaller numbers. For when a person commands pure and simple and in all matters, the rule is said to be

royal. Yet when one rules in part, according to the precepts of a certain body of knowledge, that is, according to the laws set down by political education, and when one is in part a subject, namely, subjected to certain commands of law, the form of rule is said to be political. From all this, they have concluded that all the rules previously mentioned, some of which pertain to the city and others to the household, do not specifically differ.

16. He shows the way in which the falsity of this opinion may be revealed; and he says that what has been stated is not true. This will become apparent to those who consider the matter according to his teachings, that is, according to the art of examining the matters which are set forth below. Now the method of this art is the following. Just as in other things, in order to have knowledge of the whole, it is necessary to divide the compound all the way into its elements, that is, into its indivisibles, which are the smallest parts of the whole (for example, to understand a sentence, it is necessary to divide it into its letters, and to understand a mixed body, it is necessary to divide it all the way into its elements), so if we examine those things from which the city is constructed, we will be better able to see what each one of the previously stated rules is according to itself, and how they differ from one another according to whether in each case something is able to be considered in an artful manner. For in all matters we see that, if someone inspects things according to how they arise from their principles, one will be best able to contemplate the truth in them.

And just as this is true in other matters, so it is also true of those matters upon which we focus our attention now. In regard to these words of the Philosopher, it should be noted that, in order to arrive at a knowledge of compounds, it is first necessary to work according to the resolute method, so that we may divide the compound all the way into its elements. Afterwards, however, the compositive method is necessary, so that from these indivisible principles already known we may determine the things that are caused by these principles.

17. According to the previously mentioned method, he lays out the relationship of the other communities to the city; and in this regard he makes two points. First, he discusses the other communities which are ordered to the city. Second, he addresses the community of the city....

### BOOK 3, LESSON 1

348. After the Philosopher inquires into the forms of government according to the teachings of others in Book 2, he begins to develop them according to his own opinion.

And this is divided into two parts. In the first, he makes clear the diversity of governments. In the second, he teaches how to establish the best government, in the beginning of Book 7.

Now, the first part is divided into two. In the first, he determines what pertains to the government in general. In the second, he divides the governments.

The first part [regarding government in general] is divided into two. In the first, he speaks about his intention. In the second, he pursues his proposal.

Concerning the first, he does two things. First, he shows that in order to treat governments, it is necessary first to consider the city. Second, he shows that in order to treat the city, it is necessary to consider what is a citizen.

349. Therefore, he says, first of all, that the person who wishes to consider the government and determine what each is according to its proper reason, and what kind of government it is, namely, whether it is good or bad, must first consider what is a city.

And this he demonstrates by two arguments. The first is that there can be doubt concerning this. For some people raise doubt concerning whether the city itself has engaged in certain actions when they were performed by a tyrant or by the rich of the city. In this case, some say that the city acted, while others say that the city did not act, but only the rich rulers or the tyrant; and thus there seems to be a question about whether the rich alone rule the city. And because there is a question, it is proper that it be resolved.

The second reason is that the whole aim of those who manage governments and legislation is to do business around the city, because the government is nothing other than the order of the inhabitants of the city.

350. He shows that it is necessary to define the citizen for two reasons. First, in everything that is composed from many parts, it is necessary first to consider the parts. Now, the city is a certain whole constituted of citizens, just like its parts, since the city is nothing other than a sort of multitude of citizens. Therefore, to know the city, it is necessary to consider what is a citizen.

The second reason is that concerning this point, there also happens to be doubt: for not everyone is in agreement as to what is a citizen. For sometimes a common member who is a citizen in a popular state, according to which the people govern, is not also considered a citizen in a state of the few, according to which the rich govern, because it is frequently the case that the people have no part in it. For this reason, it is evident that there is a controversy concerning the citizen, as to who is a citizen and what kind of person it is proper to call a citizen.

351. He pursues his plan. And it is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows what is a citizen. In the second, he shows what virtue makes a citizen good.

Concerning the first, he makes two points. First, he determines what is a citizen. Second, he raises certain doubts concerning this.

Concerning the first, he also makes two points. First, he shows what a citizen is according to virtue. Second, he excludes a certain false conclusion.

Concerning the first, once again he makes two points. First, he lays out certain ways according to which some people are citizens in compliance with what is not absolute. Second, he shows what a citizen is absolutely.

352. Therefore, he says, first of all, that we must, for the present, exclude those who are called citizens in certain ways, that is, according to metaphor or by comparison; these are not really citizens.

And the first way is according to residence. Now, people are not said to be truly citizens from the fact that they live in a city, because foreigners and slaves live in a city and nevertheless are not citizens absolutely.

The second way is that some people may be called citizens because they are subject to the jurisdiction of the city, namely, in that they participate in the justice of the city, through which they at some times receive a favourable judgement, and by which they are at other times judged, that is, condemned; yet this is also the case with those who have certain contracts among themselves but who are nevertheless not citizens of one city. And yet, in certain cities foreigners do not participate perfectly in this justice, as do citizens, but it is necessary that if they wish to establish justice they must assign a legal protector, that is, someone who vouches for their obedience to the law. For this reason, it is clear that outsiders participate imperfectly in the sharing of justice; and thus, according to this, they are not citizens absolutely, but are able to be called citizens in a qualified way.

In the same way, also, we call children citizens, although they have not yet been enlisted among the number of the citizens. And in the same manner, we call old men citizens, although they have already been released from the number of citizens, since they are no longer able to discharge the services of citizens. For in both cases we do not call them citizens absolutely, but with some qualification. In fact, we refer to the children as imperfect. But we call the old people advanced beyond the years which are required for the condition of citizenship, or if some other such qualification is also added, it makes no difference. For it is clear that what we intend to say: for we are asking about what a citizen is absolutely and without any qualification, which is necessary for assigning or explaining the name 'citizen'.

Now, there is a fourth way in which the same difficulty and the same solution occurs, namely, that which concerns fugitives and infamous people; for these are citizens in a qualified sense but not absolutely.

353. He shows what a citizen is absolutely. And concerning this he makes three points. First, he lays out a certain definition of the citizen. Second, he shows that this definition is not common in any government. Third, he shows how it may be corrected so that it will be common.

Therefore, he says, first of all, that there can be no better way of defining the citizen than by the fact that he participates in the conduct of justice in the city, so that he is able to judge certain matters, namely, he has the power of some authority in the affairs of the city.

But note that there are two kinds of ruling. For some forms of ruling have been fixed for a certain period of time, thus in certain cities the same person is not permitted to hold the same office twice, or he may hold it for a limited time, such as exercising a certain office for a year and afterwards not being

eligible for appointment to the same office for another three or four years. Now, the other form of ruling is not fixed for a certain period of time, such as that of a praetor, who has the power to judge certain cases, and a speaker, who has the power to express his opinion in the public assembly. However, it can happen that some such judges or speakers are not called rulers, and it may be said that they do not have any authority on account of which they may judge or address the assembly. But this proposition is not relevant, because there is no doubt except for words: for we do not find any name common to the judge and the member of the assembly; and therefore, let a name be established for this office, so that it is called 'indeterminate'. Thus, we establish that those who participate in their kind of government are citizens; and this seems to be a better definition of the citizen absolutely.

354. He shows that such a definition is not common in all governments. And he says that it is proper that this be made clear in all matters where individual subjects differ according to species, and where one of them is first by nature, another second, another having followed it; and either nothing is common to them insofar as they are such, as in the case of equivocal names, or else there is something common, but it is difficult and obscure, that is, according to some measure. Now governments, as is said later, differ according to species, and some of them are superior and some of them inferior, because those which are ordered according to right reason ought to be preferred to others, while those which are corrupt and exceed the right order of government are by nature inferior to non-corrupt governments, just as in any genus the perfect by nature come before the corrupt. But just how some governments exceed the right order will become clear later on.

For this reason, it is clear that the notion of a citizen should vary with different governments. Therefore, the definition of citizen already mentioned applies above all to the popular state, in which anyone among the people has the power to judge in certain matters and to address the assembly. However, in other governments, it sometimes happens that any citizen has this power; nevertheless, this is not necessarily so, because some of the people do not have any power, nor is the assembly of the people taken into account, but only others who have been especially summoned; and these alone through their offices judge certain cases, just as in Sparta where the ephors judge cases amongst citizens and others give sentence on other matters, and different groups judge different cases. Hence, the elders judged regarding homicides, and other rulers ruled in other cases. And thus it is also among the Carthaginians, because all their sentences are judged by certain rulers and so the common citizens do not participate in the judgement. For this reason, in such governments the notion of the citizen mentioned already does not apply.

355. He corrects the definition of the citizen already mentioned; and he says that this definition can be discussed in regard to that which is in common, because in governments other than the popular state, the member of the assembly and the praetor do not hold office for an indeterminate time,

but these two pertain only to those who hold office for a determinate time, because it belongs to some of them or even all of them to judge what is proper and to deliberate either in some matters or in all.

And from this it is clear to see what is a citizen: for he is not the one who participates in justice or the assembly but the one who exercises the judicial or deliberative function. For those who are not able to be appointed to such offices seem to have no participation in government, and thus do not seem to be citizens.

Now finally, he concludes from this that a city is nothing other than a large multitude of people such as these, who are thus called citizens, so that by themselves they are able to live sufficiently in an absolute way. For a city is a self-sufficient community, as was said in the first book.

### BOOK 3, LESSON 3

365. After the Philosopher shows what a citizen is and solves certain doubts, he now inquires about that virtue according to which the citizen is defined.

And this is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows that the virtue of the citizen is not the same absolutely as that of the good person. In the second part, he addresses certain difficulties concerning this.

Concerning the first point, he makes two points. First, he shows that the virtue of the diligent citizen is not the same absolutely as that of the good person. In the second, he shows that the virtue of a certain sort of citizen is, however, the same as that of the good person.

Concerning the first point, he makes two observations. First, he speaks of his aim: that whether, after what has been said and reasonably considered, we ought to assert that the citizen's virtue is the same as that of the good person or not; this is to ask whether someone is called a good person and a good citizen from the same cause, for virtue is that which makes the person possessing it good. Now, in order to investigate this question properly, it is necessary to show what is the virtue of the citizen by means of a figurative and metaphorical explanation.

366. He shows that the virtue of a citizen is not the same as that of the good person on three grounds.

In the first of these, he begins by offering an analogy to illustrate what is the virtue of a good citizen; and he says that just as 'sailor' signifies something common to many people, so it is with 'citizen'. For he reveals how 'sailor' is common to many people. Many people who differ in power, that is, by their art and their function, are called sailors, since one of them is a rower who moves the ship with oars, another is a pilot who guides the ship with rudders, yet another is on lookout, that is, the guardian of the prow, which is the front part of the ship, and others have other names and functions. Now it is clear that each one of these people had something that belongs to him according to his own virtue, as well as something in common.

For it pertains to the virtue of each one individually that he should have some diligent reason and care concerning his own function, for example, steering in the case of the pilot, and likewise for all the others. But the common virtue is one which belongs to all, for the work of all of them works towards the end of safe navigation: for it is this towards which the desire and intention of any sailor aims and the common virtue of sailors is ordered, which is the virtue of the sailor as sailor.

In the same way, also, since there are different citizens possessing dissimilar functions and dissimilar positions through which they exercise their proper operations in the city, the common work of all is the safety of the community. Indeed, this community consists in the order of the polity.

For this reason, it is clear that the virtue of a citizen as citizen is considered in an ordered relation to the polity, so that, namely, the good person is the person who works effectively for the preservation of the polity.

Now, there are several species of polity, as will be mentioned later as is to some extent clear from what has previously been said; but people are well ordered to different polities according to different virtues. For a popular state is preserved in some way, and the rule of a few or a tyranny in another. For this reason, it is evident that a perfect virtue does not exist according to which a citizen can be called absolutely good; but a certain person is called virtuous according to a single perfect virtue, namely, according to prudence, upon which all the moral virtues depend.

Therefore, it happens that someone is a good citizen, although he does not have the virtue according to which one is a good person; and this is the case in polities other than the best polity.

367. He lays out a second argument. And he says that by inquiring and objecting, we can arrive through another path at the same viewpoint, even concerning the best polity, namely, that the virtue of the good citizen is not the same as that of the good person, because it is impossible, however good the government may be, that all the citizens be virtuous; nevertheless it is the case that each one can perform properly his work for the city, and this happens as a result of the virtue of the citizen as citizen. And therefore, I say that all citizens cannot be the same, since then the same work would pertain to all. And from this it follows that the virtue of the good citizen is not identical with that of the good person.

This conclusion he reveals thus: in the best government, it is proper that every citizen must have the virtue of the good citizen. For in this way the city will be best; but it is impossible that all have the virtue of the good person, because all the people in a city are not virtuous, as has been said.

368. He lays out a third reason. And he says that every city is established from different elements, just like an animal. For an animal is composed immediately from unlike parts, namely, soul and body, and similarly, the human soul is composed of unlike elements, namely, a rational power and an appetitive power, and once again, the domestic community is composed

of different parts, namely, man and woman, and acquisition is also established from a master and a slave. Now, the city is established from all these different elements and from many others. But it has been said in Book 1 that the virtue of the ruler and the subject are not one and the same, neither in the soul nor in other things: for this reason, it follows that the virtue of all the citizens is not one and the same, just as we see that in a chorus, the virtue of the leader is not the same as that of the assistant, that is, the person next to the leader. But it is clear that the virtue of all good persons is one and the same: it follows, therefore, that the virtue of the good citizen and of the good person are not identical.

369. He then shows that the virtue of one citizen is the same as that of the good person.

And concerning this, he makes three points. First, he states the aim. Second, he infers the conclusion from what has already been said. Third, he addresses a certain difficulty concerning what has already been said and resolves it.

Therefore, he says, first of all, that one will perhaps be able to say that the same virtue of the good person is required of a certain good citizen in order that he be good. For a person is not said to be a good ruler unless he is good through the moral virtues and prudence. For it has been said in Book 6 of the *Ethics* that the polity has a certain part of prudence: for this reason, it is necessary that the political person, that is, the leader of the polity, must be prudent and, consequently, a good person.

370. From this he concludes that the virtue of the good citizen and the good person are not the same absolutely. And in order to prove this, he first inspects the statement made by some people that the instruction of the ruler, by which he is to be educated in virtue, is different from the instruction of the citizen, as is clear from the fact that sons of rulers are instructed in the knowledge of horsemanship and warfare. For this reason, Euripides also, speaking in the person of a ruler, said, 'It is not for me to know things which are beautiful', namely, those that are the concern of a philosopher, 'but things that function for ruling a city.' And this he said to signify that there is a certain training proper for the ruler.

And from this he concludes that if the training and virtue of the ruler and the good person are the same, but not every citizen is a ruler, for there are also citizens who are subjects, then it follows that the virtue of the citizen is not the same absolutely as the good person, unless perhaps it is a certain citizen, namely, the one who is able to be a ruler. And this is so because the virtue of the ruler and the citizen are not the same....

371. He addresses a difficulty concerning what has been said. And concerning this he makes two points. First, he objects against what has been said. Second, he resolves it.

Thus, he says, first of all, that the citizen is sometimes praised from the fact that he is able to rule and to be subject as well. If, therefore, the virtue of the

good person is the same as that of the good ruler, but the virtue of the good citizen is something that attaches itself to both of these things, namely, to ruling and to being subject, then it follows that both things, namely, to be a good citizen and a good person, are not praised similarly, but that it is much better to be a good citizen.

375. He shows how the virtue of the ruler is the same as that of other people and how it differs. And he says that even in this form of rule the virtue of the ruler is different than the subject: but nevertheless, it is fitting that the person who is a good citizen absolutely should know both how to rule and to be subject to rule, namely, not to a despotic rule, which is that of slaves, but to a political rule, which is that of free people. And this is the virtue of a citizen, so that he should be well disposed towards one and the other; and absolutely good people know both, namely, how to rule well and to be a subject. And thus the virtue of the good citizen, insofar as he can rule, is the same virtue as that of the good person; but insofar as he is a subject, the virtue of the ruler and of the good person is different from the virtue of the good citizen; for example, the temperance and justice of rulers and the temperance and justice of subjects are a different species. For the subject who is free and good does not have only one virtue, for example, justice; but his justice has two species, according to one of which he is able to rule well, and according to the other of which he is able to be a good subject. And this is also the case concerning the other virtues.

#### BOOK 3, LESSON 4

378. After the Philosopher shows what the virtue of the diligent citizen is and whether it is the same as the virtue of the good person, he addresses a certain difficulty concerning what has already been determined.

In this regard, he makes three points. First, he addresses the difficulty. Second, he resolves it. Third, he clarifies the solution.

Therefore, he says, first of all, that there still remains a certain difficulty regarding the citizen: namely, whether he is a citizen who is able to share in the governance of a city; or if common craftsmen, who do not happen to share in the government, should also be placed among the citizens.

And he objects to both parts, because if labourers, to whom nothing pertains concerning cities, are called citizens, it will follow that the virtue which we ascribed to the good citizen, namely, that he is able to rule and to be ruled, does not pertain to every citizen, because this person is placed among citizens although he is not able to rule. For it is said that no one of such a kind is a citizen; there will thus remain a doubt about the category in which a labourer should be placed. For it cannot be said that they are strangers, as if they are coming from elsewhere to live in the city; and neither are they foreigners, like travellers, who on account of some business come to the city without the motive of staying. For these craftsmen have their home in the city and are born there, and do not come from elsewhere.

379. He solves this difficulty and says that on account of this latter reason there is doubt about the appropriate category for the placement of craftsmen, but if they are not citizens it does not follow that this is in some way inappropriate. For they are people who are not citizens, and nevertheless are neither strangers nor foreigners, just as is clear concerning slaves and free people who have been returned from servitude to freedom. For it is true that not all are citizens, who are necessary for the perfection of the city and without whom the city is not able to exist, because in the case of slaves as well as children, they are not perfect citizens, as are men. For men are citizens absolutely, since they have in effect the power of performing the duties of citizens; but children are citizens by supposition, that is, with some diminishing qualification. For they are imperfect citizens; and just as slaves and children are citizens in some sense, but not perfectly, so also are craftsmen. For this reason, in ancient times, common craftsmen and even foreigners were slaves in certain cities, in such a way as many are even now.

380. He clarifies the already mentioned solution: that even in the best disposed city, workers are not able to be citizens. And if it is said that a worker is a citizen in some way, then it has to be said that the virtue of the citizen which we have defined, namely, as being able to rule and be subject equally well, is not that of the citizen, although citizenship is cited in any case. But it is proper that this virtue should pertain to them because they are not only free but are discharged, that is, released from the duties necessary for life. For if those who are assigned to such necessities serve only one man, this is properly the work of slaves; for slaves have to perform such services for their masters. But if they perform these services for anyone in general, this pertains to the work of labourers and bad people who service anyone for money.