

**When Success leads to Failure: Foreign Policy during the Bush Administration and its Influence
in the 1992 Presidential Election**

Luke Anton
Fall 2007
Critical Presidential Elections
Professor Chris Gilbert

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
The Incumbent in 1992	4
Foreign Policy in the Bush Administration	4
<i>The Gulf War</i>	5
<i>Trade with China and the Middle East</i>	7
<i>Relations with Central America</i>	12
The Major Influences of the Election	15
<i>The Budget</i>	15
<i>Unemployment</i>	18
The Challengers in 1992	19
<i>Bill Clinton</i>	19
<i>Ross Perot</i>	21
What about Foreign Policy?	25
Conclusion	29
Bibliography	32

Introduction

The 1992 presidential election is not generally considered a crucial one. Compared to today, the United States was not as heavily involved in foreign affairs as it had been; hot-button issues like gay marriage and abortion were not nearly as salient and the Republicans and Democrats seemed less polarized. The election did not cause realignment in the parties, nor did it pave a path for dominance by either party. The issues that received the most attention in the debates, by the media, and by analytical scholars of the election were the influence of a strong third party candidate and the struggling economy. In retrospect, however, the election would have gotten more attention and been more documented had the world known the magnitude of the influence that certain events and issues like the Gulf War, trade with China and the Middle East, and relations with Central America are having on the current state of world politics.

For instance, United States involvement in the Middle East during the Gulf War had significant consequences, leading it to eventually invade Iraq and continue to occupy the area for an indefinite amount of time; China is now second only to Canada as the United States' top trading partners; and many Central American countries have progressively weeded out corruption with the United States' help.¹ The culmination of these foreign policy issues had a significant effect on the strategies of each candidate, but ultimately did not have a major influence on vote choice. Statistics and scholarly analyses show that the condition and future of the economy was the primary indicator of vote choice. Therefore, foreign policy issues did not impact the outcome of the election.

¹ "Top Trading Partners," *U.S. Census Bureau*, <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/>> (9 December 2007).

Historically, foreign policy has exhibited significant influence on vote choice in presidential elections. Foreign policy issue importance is a key indicator of issue voting.² The impact of various policy attitudes on candidate appraisal and vote choice is stronger among those individuals who feel that the issue in question is important. As a result, incumbent performance evaluations among voters regarding an issue should have a stronger impact on the vote choice of individuals who find that issue important. Therefore, people concerned about a given foreign policy issue assign more weight to their evaluations of the government's performance on that issue when making up their mind.³ In other words, voter approval on foreign policy directly depends on the incumbent's performance in that issue area during his presidency. This means that presidential approval ratings in foreign policy indicate how that issue will affect vote choice, whether the influence is positive or negative.

This model is accurate for most elections; however, in certain elections foreign policy issues are more of an indicator of vote choice than others. The assessment of policy voting depends upon the specification of necessary and specific conditions for the influence of policy attitudes in the voting decision.⁴ For instance, the 1992 presidential election neatly lends itself to these conditions because the United States had just returned from military involvement in the Middle East and Central America. Other elections fall in this category as well, such as the 1980 and 2004 presidential elections.

The Iran hostage crisis was one of the most significant international events during Jimmy Carter's presidency. Historically, the American people have had a tendency to rally in support of the president when the nation becomes embroiled in international conflict; this is known as the

² Patrick Fournier, André Blais, Richard Nadeau, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Neil Nevitte, "Issue Importance and Performance Voting," *Political Behavior* Vol. 25, No. 1 (March, 2003): 51.

³ Ibid, 52.

⁴ Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page, "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 66, No. 2 (June, 1972): 450.

“rally-around-the-flag” effect.⁵ Other instances of this phenomenon include the United States’ retaliation on Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and American involvement in World War II after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. The same effect happened with Carter in 1980; his standing in the polls shot up dramatically after the Iranian takeover of the American embassy and seizure of American hostages in 1979. However, history also shows that the longer the situation persists, the more the support for the president erodes. Ergo, the Iranian hostage crisis at first helped Carter, but the situation dragged on as the election approached, causing him to drastically lose support from the American people.⁶

Another more extreme case of the “rally-around-the-flag” effect is currently visible in the United States. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., President Bush responded with the support of the people, ordering a strike on the Islamic fundamentalist group Al Qaeda. Bush then saw some of the highest presidential approval ratings in recent history. Bush was able to keep the public’s support long enough to utilize it in the 2004 election when he defeated John Kerry. In this situation, foreign policy issues helped Bush in the election and hurt Kerry. In spite of this, as the U.S. military presently remains in the Middle East, Bush now is experiencing some of the lowest approval ratings, along with public backlash and opposition to the war.

The 1980 and 2004 elections are prime examples of how foreign policy can influence vote choice positively or negatively. In these cases, the electorate’s preference was a reflection of the approval of each the incumbent candidate. The 1992 presidential election will show that this is not always the case; George Bush thrived in foreign policy yet lost the election. Clearly, more factors than just foreign policy hold sway over how the campaign agenda is formulated.

⁵ Lee Sigelman and Pamela Johnston Conover, “The Dynamics of Presidential Support during International Conflict Situations: The Iranian Hostage Crisis,” *Political Behavior* Vol. 3, No. 4 (1981): 304.

⁶ Ibid.

The Incumbent in 1992

George Herbert Walker Bush was born in Milton, Massachusetts, on June 12, 1924. He became a student leader at Phillips Academy in Andover. On his 18th birthday he enlisted in the armed forces. As the youngest pilot in the Navy to receive his wings, he flew 58 combat missions during World War II. He then went on to marry his current wife Barbara Pierce, graduate from Yale University, and embark on an oil industry career in West Texas.⁷

Bush's political background before 1980 was diverse. He served two terms as a Representative to Congress from Texas, where he also ran unsuccessfully for the Senate twice. He then was appointed to a series of high-level positions including Ambassador to the United Nations, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Chief of the United States Liaison Office in the People's Republic of China, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In 1980, Bush campaigned for the Republican nomination for president; he lost, but was chosen as a running mate by Ronald Reagan. As Vice President, Bush had responsibility in several domestic areas, including federal deregulation and anti-drug programs. Then, at the peak of his political career, he won the Republican nomination for President in 1988 with Senator Dan Quayle as his running mate; he subsequently defeated Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis in the general election.⁸

Foreign Policy in the Bush Administration

After his first term as president, Bush could not initially decide whether to run for reelection. All incumbent presidents since Nixon began gearing up for the campaign on an average of twenty-three months prior to the election, while Bush waited until a little over a year.

⁷ "George H.W. Bush," *The White House*, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/gb41.html>> (30 October 2007).

⁸ *Ibid.*

Some scholars argue that the Gulf War, absence of strong Democratic challengers, and high approval ratings resulted in a dangerous sense of complacency for the entire Bush staff.⁹ Nevertheless, Bush was in a prime position to fend off any challenger the Democratic or any other party could present. Furthermore, Bush's staff comprised one of the most experienced foreign policy teams to come to power in the post-Cold War era. Foreign policy, rather than domestic affairs, was the administration's area of expertise, interest, and passion.¹⁰ The Gulf War, international trade, and relations to Central America were the key pieces of Bush's overall foreign policy success during his term as president.

The Gulf War

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded its neighboring country of Kuwait. This occurred after talks over oil production and debt repayment broke down. Once the takeover was complete, Iraq's leader, Saddam Hussein, declared Kuwait the nineteenth province of Iraq. Fearing a subsequent invasion of Saudi Arabia, President Bush organized a multinational coalition to restore Kuwait's freedom and original government. At the request of the Saudis, President Bush sent 250,000 troops to defend the country. The United Nations responded by placing economic sanctions on Iraq, which ultimately were ineffective. When Hussein continually amassed more troops within Kuwait, Bush ordered 200,000 more troops for an offensive attack on the Iraqis in Kuwait.¹¹

On January 16, 1991, Bush won congressional approval to launch an attack on the Iraqis. He gave Iraq until February 23, 1991 to withdraw all of its troops from Kuwait, and then

⁹ Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, "Campaigning to Govern: Presidents Seeking Reelection," *Political Science and Politics* Vol. 36, No. 2 (April, 2003): 200.

¹⁰ David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001), 57.

¹¹ "The Persian Gulf War," *Pearson Education, Inc.* (2007), <<http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001293.html>> (7 November 2007).

scheduled the first ground attack for February 24, 1991. When Hussein failed to comply, the United States' military entered Kuwait and overwhelmed the Iraqis in four short days of combat. As Hussein's troops retreated back to Iraq, they set fire to over five hundred of Kuwait's oil wells as a final, desperate act of destruction to Kuwait's infrastructure. Bush then ordered a unilateral cease-fire one hundred hours after the ground offensive started. Allied and Iraqi military leaders met on the battlefield to discuss terms for a formal cease-fire to end the Gulf War. Iraq finally agreed to abide by all of the United Nations' resolutions.¹²

The Gulf War could not have transpired more ideally for the Bush administration; the offensive against the Iraqis was quick and efficient with minimal casualties. The American people recognized these successes and responded by expressing high presidential approval ratings. When victory in Kuwait was declared, the President's job approval was an impressive 89 percent.¹³ This is another clear case of the "rally-around-the-flag" effect; the American people showed strong support for Bush in a time of crisis and were rewarded with a quick, decisive victory. However, boosts in approval ratings from international conflict are usually temporary, often receding within a six month time period.¹⁴ President Bush had already experienced this effect earlier in his term. His approval ratings climbed with the invasion of Panama in 1990, and then fell significantly within a couple months.¹⁵ Bush's greatest challenge was to rally and maintain public support from his Gulf War success.

Although Bush did not absorb a large amount of criticism for the invasion of the Middle East, some analysts feel the crisis could have been avoided. For instance, some scholars argue

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Paul Brace and Barbara Hinckley, "George Bush and the Costs of High Popularity," *Political Science and Politics* Vol. 26, No. 3 (September, 1993): 501.

¹⁴ Barbara Norrande and Clyde Wilcox, "Rallying Around the Flag and Partisan Change: The Case of the Persian Gulf War," *Political Research Quarterly* Vol. 36, No. 1 (December, 1993): 759.

¹⁵ Brace and Hinckley, 501.

that the Gulf War could have been effectively deterred through the use of accurate threat assessments and credible threat signaling. Bush did not assess the capabilities and intentions of Hussein on an ongoing basis, nor did Bush respond to it in a manner that sought conciliation where possible while maintaining the possibility of confrontation.¹⁶ Another criticism is that the United States did not properly warn Iraq. For instance, according to a partial transcript released regarding the July 25, 1990 meeting between United States Ambassador April Glaspie and Saddam Hussein, the United States was not interested in Arab-Arab conflicts; but more importantly, it stated that the United States never discreetly told Hussein that the United States would fight if Iraq went across the Kuwaiti border.¹⁷ Despite these rare oppositions to the war, Bush still experienced the best job approval ratings of his term at the height of the Gulf War.

Trade with the Middle East and China

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has had to transform its geopolitical landscape in order to keep pace with new circumstances. Globalization was beginning to take off during the core of the Bush presidency. In the Middle East, Bush's goal was to secure the maximum possible advantage for American capital. In order to accomplish this, Bush began to set up the creation of a political environment friendly to the operation of international capital. Part of this involved assisting Israel to maintain its military edge over the might of the surrounding Arab armies. Following the Gulf War, Bush also expected that Iraq and Iran would be pitted against each other, hindering oil flow to the West.¹⁸

¹⁶ Larry Berman and Bruce W. Jentleson, "Bush and the Post-Cold War World: New Challenges for American Leadership," *The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals* (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1991), 119.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 120.

¹⁸ Stephen Hubbel, "The Containment Myth: U.S. Middle East Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice," *Middle East Report* No. 208 (Autumn, 1998): 9.

Overall, the success with which producing and consuming countries managed to cope with the oil-related components of the Gulf crisis suggested that both the supply and price of oil would stay manageable for the United States.¹⁹ Other Middle Eastern countries helped the United States by increasing their oil production to make up for the loss of Iraqi oil and Kuwait's diminished supply from the oil fires. This was possible because the United States boosted its own oil production in strategic areas, signaling that it had the will and ability to reduce foreign demand. Bush had successfully established enough order in key oil-producing regions in the Middle East so the United States would not suffer from the potentially problematic issues that were created from the Gulf War offensive.²⁰ The only negative yet crucial aspect of this was that it would have little, if any, impact on the U.S. economy.

Not only did Bush have success in maintaining trade relations in the Middle East, he also solidified trade relations with China and Central America. He was the chief American diplomat in Beijing during the initial phase of the normalization of U.S.-China trade talks; he managed the Sino-American relationship in the shadow of Tiananmen for most of his White House years. Annual U.S.-China trade had grown to a record high of nearly \$30 billion, effectively making China an MFN, or most-favored nation. The key trade controversies with between the United States and China dealt with intellectual property rights, convict-labor products, and the bilateral trade balance. By dealing with these issues effectively, Bush succeeded remarkably in pressing China to reform further and accept American-Western norms.²¹

Observers of China's market were initially frustrated with the United States' ability to influence the course of China's development. Since the Tiananmen incident in 1989, China had

¹⁹ Robert J. Lieber, "Oil and Power after the Gulf War," *International Security* Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer, 1992): 155.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 156.

²¹ Yangming Wang, "The Politics of U.S.-China Economics Relations: MFN, Constructive Engagement, and the Trade Issue Proper," *Asian Survey* Vol. 33, No. 5 (May, 1993): 441.

opened itself up for another country to direct its economic development, and many felt that President Bush was not capitalizing on the situation. Bush, however, maintained that the United States had not lost ground to China and should not lose hope in shaping China's reform.²² His views were reflected in the stand he took with regard to the renewal of China's most-favored nation status. In this agreement, which must be reciprocal, the participating nations guarantee to each other tariff treatment as low as that accorded to any third country; in effect, having MFN status means that one nation will not be taxed higher than any other nation. This agreement is one of the fundamental principles of the GATT, or the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (this eventually becomes known as the World Trade Organization).²³ Bush utilized the MFN status with China as a primary vehicle to influence China's trade policy development. However, the MFN issue was not widely supported as a means to maintain sway over China, especially within the Congress; therefore, Bush had to show evidence that the United States was able to advance American interests in China through other means.

The next step for Bush in China was to set up a system of protection for intellectual property rights. The existence of the intellectual property rights problem was a strong indicator of how foreign the Western market system was to China. Under the Chinese Communist Party, intellectuals, such as engineers, doctors, scientists, writers, and all professionals engaging in mental labor, had been classified as excluded from the working class; their work was treated as a public product of society. Any innovative or valuable intellectual work was free for use across the country, as long as it was approved by party authorities.²⁴ China eventually began a slow and uneasy reform of intellectual property rights, but they were still not up to American standards. For instance, the scope of patent protection in China was narrow compared to Western standards;

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid, 442.

²⁴ Ibid.

chemical and pharmaceutical formulas, microorganisms, and computer software were still excluded from protection. Foreigners were also confused about the agencies administering and enforcing these laws.²⁵

In May of 1989, in hopes of furthering its influence over China's development, the Bush administration negotiated a U.S.-China memorandum of understanding in which China agreed to submit a copyright law to the National People's Congress by the end of the year. China also agreed to amend its patent law to extend the term and scope of protection. China's intellectual protection laws were still inadequate, so Bush put the nation on the "priority watch list," and soon after to the "target priority foreign country list."²⁶ This began a six-month investigation of China's protection policies. The Bush administration finally threatened to place trade sanctions on China if it did not reform its policies up to American standards; this action ignited China to move more speedily toward Western norms.²⁷ Now Bush's strategy saw progression since China was beginning to reflect American ways.

Another key issue involving trade relations with China that the Bush administration remolded to favor the United States was convict-labor products. According to section 307 of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, the United States prohibits the importation of goods produced by force, slave, or prison labor.²⁸ Evidence surfaced during Bush's term that some Chinese exports to the United States were being produced in prison-run factories. Under President Bush's instructions, the U.S. government took steps to block imports of Chinese goods suspected of originating from prison labor. In September of 1991, the U.S. Customs Service announced that it would hold all shipments of open-end spanners, socket wrenches, and steel pipe made by

²⁵ Ibid, 445-446.

²⁶ Ibid, 447.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid, 449.

four factories known to employ prison labor.²⁹ The two countries then signed a memorandum of understanding in 1992, under which the Chinese agreed to take steps to halt any exports of goods produced by prison labor. In order to ensure proper enforcement, the Chinese further agreed to allow U.S. Customs officials to conduct routine inspections of Chinese facilities suspected of using prison labor.³⁰ The Bush administration was on a firm path to creating realistic trading policies with China; furthermore, Bush's policies seemed to have genuine potential of maintaining the administration's staying power.

The final critical U.S.-China trade issue regarded the balance of trade. Statistics show that between 1987 and 1991, the bilateral trade of both the United States and China had increased rapidly; the exports of each country to the other kept increasing; and the U.S. statistics on exports to China compared with China's figures on imports from the U.S. were fairly close.³¹ The major discrepancies appeared in China's exports to the United States. The U.S. imports a substantially higher number of goods from China than China does from the U.S. The result was a large deficit claims by the United States in the early 1990s. In order to maintain trade relations with the United States, China had to address the problem. The Bush administration sought to have China make their trade-related laws and regulations transparent, reduce tariffs, dismantle the import licensing system, and remove technical barriers such as unnecessary testing and standards requirements.³² In other words, China had to open its market wider yet, make itself freer for trade, become more Western oriented, and buy more American goods. With of all of Bush's dealings with China concerning trade-relations, he successfully applied the right amount of pressure in order to influence the reformation of China's economic system and policies. The

²⁹ Ibid, 450.

³⁰ Marcus Noland, "U.S.-China Economic Relations," *Peterson Institute for International Economics*, <<http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp.cfm?ResearchID=162>> (13 November 2007).

³¹ Wang, 451.

³² Wang, 457.

new relationship Bush established with China would not have immediate positive effects on the economy. Instead, it laid the groundwork for future economic prosperity, which would eventually be exploited by the Clinton administration in the eight years following the 1992 election.

Relations with Central America

China was not the only area of the world in which Bush found success establishing policies. He also worked to strengthen the existing trade relationship between the United States and Latin America. He was particularly successful in dealing with El Salvador and Panama. El Salvador initially presented problems for the United States because soon after Bush's inauguration, Alfredo Cristiani was elected as El Salvador's president. His victory marked the collapse of the Christian Democratic Party and the end of a decade of U.S. policy. Cristiani's party, known as ARENA, represented the extreme right; the U.S.'s fear was that ARENA supporters would see Cristiani's victory as a mandate for repression. As a counteractive move, Bush sent Vice-President Dan Quayle to warn El Salvador's government and army that the United States' continued support depended upon the new government's prevention of any backsliding on human rights. Unfortunately, a powerful political party consisting of guerillas, known as the FMLN, launched a series of attacks against the government.³³

The attacks were a response to the U.S. and the new Salvadoran government; they showed that the guerillas were a long way from being defeated militarily and revealed a greater degree of political support for the FMLN than many observers thought they commanded. The final consequence of the attacks was that they badly damaged the government's claim to be a

³³ William M. LeoGrande, "From Reagan to Bush: The Transition in U.S. Policy towards Central America," *Journal of Latin American Studies* Vol. 22, No. 3 (October, 1990): 609.

democracy, since many civilians were killed by the military when overtaking the guerillas.³⁴ After the offensive, the Bush administration became more open to the possibility of a settlement. Regarding this issue, the administration said, "El Salvador needs peace, and the only path to peace is at the negotiating table."³⁵ As talks began, a settlement seemed difficult to achieve since the Salvadoran armed forces had little incentive to accept military reforms that the guerillas were demanding. Eventually, the administration's threat to put severe limits on aid to El Salvador sparked the development of a bipartisan policy that called for reforms in the Salvadoran military.³⁶ Bush's success in moving toward peace in El Salvador strengthened his foreign policy reputation, and his subsequent dealings with Panama would only reinforce it.

The problem inherited by Bush in Panama was a direct legacy of the Reagan administration's unsuccessful efforts to unseat General Manuel Antonio Noriega, who was commander of the Panamanian Defense Force. Noriega fell into disrepute with the United States in 1987 due to his growing ties with the Columbia cocaine cartel.³⁷ Along with economic sanctions imposed by the Reagan administration, Bush undertook a \$10 million operation to help the opposition in the election of 1989. The election was strongly criticized due to its suspicious irregularities, such as the inflation of the registry, which suggests government-sponsored election fraud.³⁸ Noriega eventually won the election despite independent opinion polls indicating a three to one advantage for ADOC candidate Guillermo Endara. The Bush administration rallied its allies, criticizing the election and its attendant violence.³⁹

³⁴ Ibid, 612.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid, 613.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid, 614.

³⁹ Ibid, 615.

The election fraud prompted the United States to launch a new, more determined effort to oust Noriega from power. The U.S. increased the number of troops guarding the Panama Canal to 13,000, while also tightening the economic sanctions further to reduce the payments of \$250 million that U.S. corporations were supposed to make to the Panamanian government. President Bush then spoke out, calling for Noriega's immediate resignation. The U.S. military threatened Noriega by rumbling its armor through the city streets, dropping paratroopers on U.S. Embassy grounds, and sending columns of troops in full battle gear to drive past Noriega's headquarters.⁴⁰

Through most of his dealings with Panama, Bush enjoyed bipartisan support for his policy. The key for the administration was keeping the issue of Panama Canal treaties separate from the feud with Noriega. Some members of Congress urged Bush to be even tougher, which is eventually what Bush would do. On December 20, 1989, as a result of the killing of one U.S. military officer and the arrest and brutalization of two U.S. witnesses to the event, President Bush ordered 24,000 troops to be positioned across Panama. The U.S. military obliterated the Panamanian Defense Force in a few days, installing Guillermo Endara as the new president.⁴¹ The invasion of Panama was as successful as the upcoming invasion of Kuwait would be. The operation was over quickly, U.S. casualties were low, and it achieved its primary mission of replacing Noriega. Although more Panamanian civilians were killed than was hoped, animosity toward the United States was low because anger over the invasion was offset by the relief that Noriega's corrupt and brutal reign was over. At home, the invasion gave President Bush an image of strength and boosted his ratings in public opinion polls by about twelve points.⁴²

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid, 618.

⁴² Ibid.

The Major Influences of the Election

Even with a nearly unblemished foreign policy résumé accredited to him, Bush still lost the 1992 presidential election. This is accredited to the fact that other greater influences on voters surfaced that virtually forced Bush to adjust his campaign strategy from offensive to defensive. He was unable to dictate the campaign by pushing foreign policy issues, along with taxes and family values, to the forefront, where he would have held a solid advantage over Clinton and Perot. Instead, the economy was the greatest determining factor for vote choice in the election.⁴³ As a result, Clinton and Perot were able to successfully attack Bush's inadequacies on the issue, forcing him to remain defensive in the debates and throughout the campaign in general. In order for observers to understand how the electorate came to vote primarily on the economy, it is important for them to have an idea of the condition of the economy during Bush's term until the time of the election. The economic issue during Bush's term was comprised of two primary aspects—the budget and unemployment.

The Budget

At the outset of his term, Bush's central test was whether the administration could reach an agreement with Congress on a budget policy that would substantially reduce the federal deficit. This was crucial because most economists held that deficit reduction was vital to the nation's long-term economic health.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the magnitude of the discrepancy between revenues and expenditures would also dictate whether the president could seriously contemplate any significant new expenditures. In order to accomplish this feat, Bush vowed to follow strict

⁴³ Paul J. Quirk and Jon K. Dalager, "The Election: A 'New Democrat' and a New Kind of Presidential Campaign," Michael Nelson, Ed., *The Elections of 1992* (Washington D.C.: Congress Quarterly Inc., 1993), 80.

⁴⁴ Paul J. Quirk, "Domestic Policy: Divided Government and Cooperative Presidential Leadership," Colin Campbell and Bert Rockman, Eds., *The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals* (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1991), 76.

bipartisanship in his budgetary strategy. This was especially important since he was dealing with a Democratic Congress.⁴⁵

In President Bush's first budget, for fiscal year 1990, he called for a fiscal deficit of \$100 billion, with a \$10 billion cushion, so any losses over \$110 billion would result in automatic spending cuts. Bush, however, ran into problems when attempting to develop a formula to meet this plan: he would not modify his stand on taxes, since he promised no new taxes to the American people. This complicated the budget plans because Bush failed to propose any reasonable alternative for meeting the goals. At one point, the Bush administration proposed a plan to increase spending in popular areas, such as the space program and education, while promising spending cuts in other areas without listing them.⁴⁶ In essence, it covered up the necessity for painful choices and intended to leave the real budget deficit virtually untouched for another year. The White House and congressional leaders eventually announced an agreement that purported to cut deficits by \$28 billion. The result of Bush's first year of budgetary planning was an absence of any genuine deficit reduction.⁴⁷

The next fiscal year proved to be pivotal for Bush in building a credible reputation as a president. For the 1991 fiscal year he could not side-step the difficult choices on the deficit. He also knew that he could not realistically cut the deficit without a tax increase. This was a problem because Bush had spent a year reinforcing his pledge of no new taxes, while also encouraging his fellow Republicans to do the same. His proposal was comprised of spending cuts on many programs favored by Democrats, like Medicare, with small defense cuts and a tax increase. If achieved, the budget deficit would show a modest amount of \$36.5 billion.

Unfortunately, due to the rapidly escalating costs of salvaging the savings-and-loan industry,

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 77.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 78.

budget policymakers forecasted a deficit of nearly eight times that amount—a whopping \$231 billion.⁴⁸ Consequentially, Bush had no option but to renege on his tax promise; he openly acknowledged to the public that he would accept a negotiated budget package that included a tax increase. This move outraged many Republicans, causing Bush to lose much support within his own party.⁴⁹

The new budgetary package, despite the president's public address and bipartisan congressional leadership, was still a tough sell to the congressional majority. Conservatives were still appalled by the tax increases and many liberals were equally angered by some of the spending cuts. The Congress rejected the agreement by a count of 179 to 254. This led to Bush having to temporarily close down the government to increase the pressure on Congress to pass a budget. Bush showed confusion and poor leadership when he was forced to react to a Democratic proposal for a tax increase on high-income families; he changed his mind three times in two days on whether to accept it. The administration finally pieced together a modified package of tax increases and spending cuts that claimed 1991 deficit savings of \$40 billion.⁵⁰

The series of gyrations that Bush went through left the budget process in chaos, damaging his party's standing with the voters and compromising the credibility of his presidency. In a larger sense, he had been a major source of all the difficulties; both by his own rigidity and by the effect of his rhetoric on other politicians, he had driven federal budgeting to a new level of contention and uncertainty.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Ibid, 79.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 81.

⁵¹ Ibid, 82.

Unemployment

Beside the budget crisis, President Bush also had to deal with drastic fluctuations in the unemployment and inflation rate. At the outset of his term, unemployment was at a modest rate of about five percent, and it would remain at that percentage until the beginning of 1990. Unemployment then gradually escalated throughout the year until it peaked at the start of 1991 at about 7 percent. Bush slowly managed to chip the rates down as the election was approaching; still, with rates escalating to those levels, voters had already lost confidence in his ability to manage this aspect of the economy effectively.⁵²

Inflation, on the other hand, followed a different course throughout Bush's term. Price increases were modest; monthly figures never rose above 6 percent on an annual basis and they dipped under 3 percent for several months in 1992. This might suggest that the president should have seen greater economic approval. In spite of this, the recession, along with the income losses and unemployment that accompanied it, became the focuses of media attention and public concern.⁵³ Scholars explain this saying that the level of unemployment and the expected change in unemployment (which the public had no reason to be optimistic about) significantly influence the public's perception of the president's performance, whereas levels of inflation and expected levels of inflation do not.⁵⁴

With all of Bush's shortcomings during his term as president, it would be difficult to remain on the offensive against his challengers, especially with the economy officially in a recession. His best strategy would undoubtedly be to overemphasize his expertise and

⁵² Harold D. Clarke, Jonathan Rapkin, and Marianne C. Stewart, "A President out of Work: A Note on the Political Economy of Presidential Approval during the Bush Years," *British Journal of Political Science* Vol. 24, No. 4 (October, 1994): 537.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 538.

⁵⁴ Pami Dua, David J. Smyth, and Susan W. Taylor, "Public Perceptions of Macroeconomic Policy during the Bush Presidency," *Southern Economic Journal* Vol. 61 (1995): 3.

accomplishments in foreign policy. Unfortunately for him, the two other challengers were wise enough to pinpoint Bush's weaknesses and exploit them.

The Challengers in 1992

Bill Clinton

William Jefferson Blythe III was born on August 19, 1946, in Hope, Arkansas, three months after his father died in a traffic accident. When he was four years old his mother wed Roger Clinton of Hot Springs, Arkansas. Not until high school did Clinton decide to take the family name. His inspiration to become a politician stemmed from an encounter with President John F. Kennedy when he was in high school. He graduated from Georgetown University, winning a Rhodes scholarship to Oxford University in 1968. He then received a law degree from Yale University in 1973.⁵⁵ One year later, Clinton entered into politics in Arkansas. After unsuccessfully running for Arkansas' Third District seat he married Hillary Rodham. He was elected Arkansas Attorney General in 1976, and then won the governorship in 1978; despite losing a bid for a second term, he regained the office four years later where he would serve until he decided to run for president in 1992.⁵⁶

Bill Clinton had been relatively unknown to the American public before his campaign for the Democratic nomination. He was a prominent player in the Democratic Party and had a distinguished record of public service. Unlike most other Democrats, he was well positioned ideologically to pursue the presidency due to his moderate stances on issues like the death penalty, abortion, and welfare. Overall, he was immune to the traditional Republican charge of extreme liberalism, and his Arkansas roots reinforced his credibility. Clinton's primary goal was

⁵⁵ "William J. Clinton," *The White House*, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/bc42.html>> (30 October 2007).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

to devise a solid campaign strategy; with the well-known James Carville as his chief strategist, Clinton was able to achieve this while avoiding serious mistakes.⁵⁷

Clinton and his staff could not match the foreign policy prowess of the Bush administration; more importantly though, Clinton did not feel that they needed to. In contrast with Bush, Clinton believed that the United States had paid its dues abroad and the country needed to revitalize itself at home.⁵⁸ Clinton's campaign proclaimed that he was a "new kind of Democrat." To appeal to the voters' dissatisfaction with the direction of the country, he adopted the theme of change and emphasized the one issue that was at the forefront of voters' minds—the economy.⁵⁹ He declared that he would "focus like a laser beam on the (United States') economy" and "foreign policy will come into play in part as it affects the economy."⁶⁰

Clinton repeatedly attacked Republican "trickle-down economics" and pointed to the lack of job growth during Bush's term. Promising to do better, Clinton offered a specific economic program that included plans to tax the wealthy, increase public investment in job training and infrastructure, and reform the educational system. Clinton's campaign was clearly aware that the economy during the last four years was Bush's biggest weakness. He had no intention of significantly addressing any issue that did not deal in some way with the economy. Furthermore, foreign policy matters were the last thing the Clinton campaign wanted to tackle. He even declined to exploit Bush's increased vulnerability in the Iran-contra scandal, allowing potentially embarrassing news stories of Bush's involvement to pass by almost unnoticed in order to remain distant from the topic area.⁶¹ Instead, he kept Bush on the defensive by constantly attacking

⁵⁷ Quirk and Dalager, 63.

⁵⁸ Linda B. Miller, "The Clinton Years: Reinventing Foreign Policy?" *International Affairs* Vol. 70, No. 4 (October, 1994): 622.

⁵⁹ Quirk and Dalager, 63.

⁶⁰ Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Issue and Themes: Spiral of Delegitimation or New Social Covenant?" *The Elections of 1992* (Washington D.C.: Congress Quarterly Inc., 1993), 112.

⁶¹ Quirk and Dalager, 64.

Bush's economic performance and allowing Bush little, if any, room to control the campaign agenda.

Clinton also demonstrated two other qualities that proved successful for his campaign. First, he and his strategists judged that his campaign should mostly refrain from negative campaigning. They determined that the public was tired of negative politics and that attacking Bush or Quayle personally would backfire by shifting the focus of the campaign from the economy. Second, in contrast with Bush, Clinton proved to be a tireless, skilled, and enthusiastic campaigner. He seemed to relish the campaign trail, taking few days off. He also carefully managed the impression he made on voters. He became known for appearing in town meetings and on talk shows, often playing the saxophone while wearing dark sunglasses. Clinton's character, coherence in speech, and command of the issues allowed him to perform well at all kinds of campaign events.⁶² Along with all his strengths, he also had help in many ways from an unexpected source—Ross Perot.

Ross Perot

Ross Perot was born June 27, 1930, in Texarkana, Texas, where his family lived in modest circumstances. He entered the United States Naval Academy in 1949 and graduated in 1953. While enlisted he served as class president, chairman of the honor committee, and battalion commander. Once he graduated, Perot served at sea for four years on a destroyer and an aircraft carrier. Then in 1956, he married Margot Birmingham from Greensburg, Pennsylvania, whom he met while a midshipman at the Naval Academy. Upon his honorable discharge from the Navy in 1957, Ross and Margot settled in Dallas where he went to work for

⁶² Ibid.

IBM's data processing division as a salesman.⁶³ In 1962 Perot's wife lent him \$1,000 from her savings account so he could start a data processing company. He named the company Electronic Data Systems, which is now a multi-billion dollar corporation.⁶⁴

In 1969, the U.S. government asked Perot to determine what action might be taken to improve the brutal treatment POW's were receiving in Southeast Asia. He worked on this project for the next four years, placing himself and his family at considerable personal risk, until the prisoners were released in 1972 at the end of the Vietnam War. In recognition of his efforts, Perot received the Medal for Distinguished Public Service, which is the highest civilian award presented by the Department of Defense.⁶⁵ Then, in 1992, he decided to run for president against Bush and Clinton.

Perot's main objective in entering the race was not to win the election, but rather to serve as an outlet for voters who were angry with the status quo of the modern politics and emphasize certain issues he felt should be known to the voters. Voters' attraction to him was mostly due to his engaging, plain-speaking manner, and an acceptance by voters of his simple prescriptions for the problems of government. He spoke bluntly, using metaphors and analogies that ordinary citizens could understand. Perot's political ideology and policy views were largely undefined except for one—the economy. He was particularly concerned with lowering the budget deficit; he attributed the poor performance of the economy largely to the national debt. In a sense, he backed up Clinton (or Clinton backed him) by attacking Bush for playing “the blame game” in

⁶³ “About Ross Perot” (16 February 1998), <<http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/5396/RPBio.html>> (30 October 2007).

⁶⁴ “About EDS,” *EDS: Expertise, Answers, Results* (2007), <<http://www.eds.com/about/>> (18 December 2007).

⁶⁵ “About Ross Perot.”

regard to the economy. Voters likely credited Perot's ability to get the job done due to his undeniable success in business.⁶⁶

Perot, like Clinton, refrained from delving into foreign policy issues. Unlike Clinton though, he was not doing it to receive more votes, but rather to get his own message across, which did not involve foreign policy. His influence was difficult to measure since he ran a rather inconsistent campaign; for instance, he dropped out of the race in July when some polls showed him leading.⁶⁷ He appeared frequently on national television programs and ran an extensive television advertising campaign, all of which he paid for with his own money. Much of the television advertising was in the form of half-hour infomercials that discussed the problems of the American economy. He essentially did not have a comprehensive strategy; he declined to participate in the daily campaign grind of touring the country. The final important aspect of his campaign strategy was that he did not consistently attack the front-runner. For the most part, he slammed Bush even when Clinton was in the lead. His campaign evidently showed that he preferred Clinton to Bush, and he did not want any responsibility for a Bush victory.⁶⁸ In fact, polls showed that Clinton received more votes than Bush and Perot if the voter was discontent with the economy; Perot was equally responsible as Clinton was for this trend.⁶⁹ In the end, he established himself as a political force by drawing attention to the deficit and directing votes toward one end of the spectrum by overemphasizing the economy and, by ignoring the issue, diminishing the influence of foreign policy.

It often seemed throughout the campaign that Perot and Clinton worked collectively to exert pressure on Bush. Their teamwork ultimately paid off since voters who had a negative

⁶⁶ Quirk and Dalager, 65.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 66.

⁶⁹ R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler, "Economics, Issues, and the Perot Candidacy: Voter Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election," *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 39, No. 3. (August, 1995): 731.

perception of the economy tended to vote for Clinton or Perot before Bush (see Table 1). For instance, in the debates the two candidates utilized the public's negative perception of the economy to their advantage by painting the bleakest picture of it as possible. Clinton stated in the first debate that he wanted to "depart from trickle-down economics," while Perot insisted that "the U.S. economy requires a drastic change to the system." Bush tried to defend himself against the onslaught of criticism saying, "In spite of the economic problems in (the United States), we are still the most respected economy in the world."⁷⁰ The only time either addressed foreign policy was if a question was asked by the moderator, and even then the subject was quickly diverted back to the economy.

Table 1: Vote Choice based on the Nation's Economic Condition in 1992 (%)

	Clinton	Bush	Perot
Excellent (1)	53	35	12
Good (18)	8	82	10
Not Good (47)	43	37	20
Poor (32)	64	12	24

Source: Quirk and Dalager, 81.

⁷⁰ *Road to the Presidency: Inside the Clinton Campaign* (Chicago: Subtle Communications, 1992).

What about Foreign Policy?

If foreign policy had been at least a moderate indicator of vote choice in the election, the final results would have shown Bush with noticeably more votes, perhaps even more than Clinton. This, however, was not the case; foreign policy proved to be a small indicator of vote choice. For most voters the economy was the primary issue that swayed the vote one way or the other (see Table 2). Surprisingly, for voters who were aware of and concerned about candidates' positions on abortion, the issue was also a key indicator of vote choice. It was more of an indicator than the Gulf War or defense spending for both Clinton and Bush.⁷¹ So, why were foreign policy issues seemingly unimportant to voters? Evidence points to five plausible responses to the question: (1) foreign policy issues are never important in any election, (2) foreign policy issues are not directly accessible in voters' daily lives, (3) the media holds considerable sway over the public's perception of what issues are important, (4) voters rarely vote heavily on issues that are going well for the incumbent administration, and (5) Bush failed to tie himself to his record of foreign policy accomplishment.

The first explanation has potential to drastically impact the overall political strategies of presidential campaigns. Studies performed during different elections support this conclusion. For instance, public opinion polls in the 1984 presidential election showed that people do not follow foreign affairs closely and often do not know enough about the specifics of a particular issue to form opinions. Similarly, in 1949, scholars concluded that 30 percent of the public was

⁷¹ Alan I. Abramowitz, "It's Abortion Stupid: Policy Voting in the 1992 Presidential Election," *Journal of Politics* Vol. 57, No. 1 (February, 1995): 185.

unaware of foreign issues, another 45 percent was aware but unable to frame a logical argument, and the remaining 25 percent had some knowledge of foreign problems.⁷²

Table 2: Vote Choice based on Issues that Mattered the Most (%)

	Clinton	Bush	Perot
Health Care (20)	67	20	14
Budget Deficit (21)	36	27	37
Abortion (12)	36	55	9
Education (13)	60	25	16
Economy/Jobs (42)	52	25	24
Environment (5)	72	14	13
Taxes (14)	26	57	18
Foreign Policy (8)	8	87	5
Family Values (15)	22	67	12

Source: Quirk and Dalager, 81.

Scholars have also suggested that foreign policy has little to no influence on voting behavior. Evidence supports the conclusion that foreign policy issues had a modest effect on the electoral outcome of 1956, but had virtually no impact between 1960 and 1976. The only elections in which foreign policy was important to voters were 1952, 1972, and 1980. In these three elections, the Korean and Vietnam Wars and the Iran hostage crisis influenced voter behavior because they contained a strong domestic component that affected Americans' daily

⁷² John H. Aldrich, John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz before a Blind Audience?'" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 83, No. 1 (March, 1989): 124.

lives.⁷³ Furthermore, this analysis falls in line with the 2004 presidential election. The War on Terror, as a result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, deeply affected American domestic life; therefore, it was an issue that heavily swayed voting behavior. Ergo, the 1992 election illustrates how the Gulf War, establishment of trade with China, and U.S. relations with Central America were, in a sense, too successful because they were carried out smoothly and with such swiftness that they had little effect on the lives of Americans.

Another likely explanation for foreign policy's overall lack of influence is the problem of accessibility. Available or existing attitudes on foreign policy must first be made available or accessible from memory if they are to exert any power on perceptions, judgment, or behavior. The necessary implication of this analysis is that domestic policy is a crucial factor in voting behavior; just as foreign policy issues are less salient because they are less accessible, domestic policy issues are more salient because they are more accessible. The public is also more likely to have direct experience with domestic issues, such as inflation and unemployment, rather than arms negotiations or policies toward Central America.⁷⁴

While multiple sources of accessibility exist, the greatest mobilizing force in modern politics is the media. It has the ability to create, sustain, or change the availability and accessibility of attitudes toward certain issues. In 1992, scholars point to the media for framing much of the debate around the economy. The discussion was most often in Clinton's favor since the tone was almost always negative. For instance, economic data showed marked improvement from the recent recession in March 1991, but later that year the media shifted its focus from the

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 126.

Gulf War to the economic “crisis.” Illustrating the apparent power of the mass media, public concern over the economy rose soon after.⁷⁵

Despite evidence that foreign policy is not generally a determining factor in any election, foreign policy issues have a lack of accessibility, and the media has the ability to shape the presidential campaign agenda, some scholars hold that none of these answers provide an accurate account of why foreign policy was not influential in the particular election of 1992. The final resolutions can be explicated by comparing the 1992 election to the 2000 election. The issues that received the most prominence in the campaign were based in areas that needed the most improvement. Additionally, the failings of the two accomplished individuals—George H.W. Bush and Al Gore—to associate themselves with past successes also deserve consideration.

The 2000 election followed eight years of significant economic progress under the Clinton administration. The public overwhelmingly thought the economy was doing well and saw the nation as on the right track economically, but Clinton’s former vice-president and Democratic candidate Al Gore received little political advantage from this optimism. In fact, only a small fraction thought him to be better qualified than Republican candidate George W. Bush. Gore essentially conceded the issue of prosperity to Bush by focusing on the future and what still needed improvement.⁷⁶ Similarly for the 1992 election, George H.W. Bush unsuccessfully linked his foreign policy achievements to his ability to lead the country for another term. For Bush, however, a lack of strategy is not necessarily to blame, but rather the way Clinton and Perot constantly kept him on the defense and unable to push foreign policy issues to the front of the discussion.

⁷⁵ Marc J. Hetherington, “The Media’s Role in Forming Voters’ National Economic Evaluations in 1992,” *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 1996): 374.

⁷⁶ Gerald M. Pomper, “The Presidential Election,” Gerald M. Pomper, Ed., *The Election of 2000* (New York: Chatham House Publisher of Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2001), 141.

The 2000 and 2004 elections also demonstrated another vital trend in voting behavior. The economy has historically shown a large influence on voters, but these two elections did not remain true to the trend, however. Instead, the 2000 election focused on issues like health care, education, and candidate character, while the 2004 election was dominated by foreign policy. To explain these two anomalies, scholars point to a trend in voting behavior. The trend shows that the public will generally vote on issues that require the most improvement.⁷⁷ Furthermore, voters do not generally anticipate considerable differences among candidates in handling issues that are already experiencing prosperity.⁷⁸ For example, voters in 2000 felt that either Bush or Gore would continue to direct the economy toward further development. In 1992, voters behaved similarly on the issue of foreign policy. Due to the long history of success, accompanied by the absence of reasonable doubt for the future in voters' minds, the issue of foreign policy in 1992, analogous to the economy in 2000, was never primed to play a prominent role in the election.⁷⁹

Conclusion

When everything is considered, the ultimate answer for foreign policy's influence in the 1992 presidential election is a combination of each of the previously proposed explanations. Some of them, however, are more salient than others. The most applicable explanations are the problem of accessibility and voters' tendency to vote on issues that require considerable improvement and disregard those that do not. While the notion of accessibility may not be applicable to modern foreign policy, the War on Terror, the Gulf War, and foreign issues in 1992 were less dominant in media coverage. As a result, the public was less informed on these issues,

⁷⁷ Alvarez and Nagler, 733.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 143.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

whereas the economy received much attention, allowing more information on which to form an opinion. The voting trend also signified that no matter how well an incumbent has performed in a given issue area, the public still demands advancement in more lacking areas. Unlike George H.W. Bush, some candidates are better able to associate themselves with past achievement, but the success with which this attained is negligible when compared to voters' perception of how they will perform on issues demanding more attention.

Therefore, despite Bush's exceptional success with executing the Gulf War, maintaining trade with the Middle East, establishing trade with China, and solidifying relations with Central America, Bush was doomed to lose the election. The public, with assistance from the media, Clinton, and Perot, viewed the economy as the issue in the most need of attention and improvement. The public also deemed that Bush, Clinton, or Perot would all perform well with foreign policy if elected president, but not with the economy. Bush had already exposed his inabilities to operate the economy effectively to the nation through his inadequate budgetary planning and inability to manage unemployment, ruining his chances for reelection. Instead, Clinton was considered the most adequate candidate to address the problems of the nation; he would ultimately go on to vindicate the public's assessment in his next two terms in office.

The election of 1992 shows how different sources of influence can come together in any given election to shape the campaign agenda. History had shown that foreign policy was important for determining vote choice, but the conditions surrounding the election caused a shift in the trend. In retrospect, foreign policy certainly would have been more influential had the public known the nation's future concerning trade with China and the Middle East, but most importantly, relations with the Middle East. This shows that, realistically, voters can only consider tangible conditions that exist at the present time. This information and analysis, if

properly applied by future presidential candidates, can point them in the appropriate direction when they attempt to shape the campaign agenda. This will lead to the candidates addressing issues the public cares about, resulting in a more publicly involved campaigning process and a higher voter turnout in the general election.

Bibliography

- "About EDS." *EDS: Expertise, Answers, Results* (2007). <<http://www.eds.com/about/>> (18 December 2007).
- "About Ross Perot" (16 February 1998).
<<http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/5396/RPBio.html>> (30 October 2007).
- Abramowitz, Alan I. "It's Abortion Stupid: Policy Voting in the 1992 Presidential Election." *Journal of Politics* Vol. 57, No. 1 (February, 1995): 176-186.
- Aldrich, John H., John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida. "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz before a Blind Audience?'" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 83, No. 1 (March, 1989): 123-141.
- Alvarez, Michael R. and Jonathan Nagler. "Economics, Issues, and the Perot Candidacy: Voter Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 39, No. 3. (August, 1995): 714-744.
- Brace, Paul and Barbara Hinckley. "George Bush and the Costs of High Popularity." *Political Science and Politics* Vol. 26, No. 3 (September, 1993): 501-506.
- Berman, Larry and Bruce W. Jentleson. "Bush and the Post-Cold War World: New Challenges for American Leadership." *The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals* (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1991).
- Brody, Richard A. and Benjamin I. Page. "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting." *American Political Science Review* Vol. 66, No. 2 (June, 1972): 450-458.
- Clarke, Harold D., Jonathan Rapkin, and Marianne C. Stewart. "A President out of Work: A Note on the Political Economy of Presidential Approval during the Bush Years." *British Journal of Political Science* Vol. 24, No. 4 (October, 1994): 535-548.
- Dua, Pami, David J. Smyth, and Susan W. Taylor. "Public Perceptions of Macroeconomic Policy during the Bush Presidency." *Southern Economic Journal* Vol. 61 (1995): 3-17.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke. "Issue and Themes: Spiral of Delegation or New Social Covenant?" *The Elections of 1992* (Washington D.C.: Congress Quarterly Inc., 1993).
- Fournier, Patrick, André Blais, Richard Nadeau, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Neil Nevitte. "Issue Importance and Performance Voting." *Political Behavior* Vol. 25, No. 1 (March, 2003): 51-67.
- "George H.W. Bush." *The White House*.
<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/gb41.html>> (30 October 2007).

- Halberstam, David. *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001).
- Hetherington, Marc J. "The Media's Role in Forming Voters' National Economic Evaluations in 1992." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 1996): 372-395.
- Hubbel, Stephen. "The Containment Myth: U.S. Middle East Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice." *Middle East Report* No. 208 (Autumn, 1998): 8-11.
- LeoGrande, William M. "From Reagan to Bush: The Transition in U.S. Policy towards Central America." *Journal of Latin American Studies* Vol. 22, No. 3 (October, 1990): 595-621.
- Lieber, Robert J. "Oil and Power after the Gulf War." *International Security* Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer, 1992): 155-176.
- Miller, Linda B. "The Clinton Years: Reinventing Foreign Policy?" *International Affairs* Vol. 70, No. 4 (October, 1994): 621-634.
- Noland, Marcus. "U.S.-China Economic Relations." *Peterson Institute for International Economics*. <<http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp.cfm?ResearchID=162>> (13 November 2007).
- Norrander, Barbara and Clyde Wilcox. "Rallying Around the Flag and Partisan Change: The Case of the Persian Gulf War." *Political Research Quarterly* Vol. 36, No. 1 (December, 1993): 759-770.
- Pomper, Gerald M. "The Presidential Election." Gerald M. Pomper, Ed. *The Election of 2000* (New York: Chatham House Publisher of Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2001).
- Quirk, Paul J. "Domestic Policy: Divided Government and Cooperative Presidential Leadership." Colin Campbell and Bert Rockman, Eds. *The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals* (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1991).
- Quirk Paul J. and Jon K. Dalager. "The Election: A 'New Democrat' and a New Kind of Presidential Campaign." Michael Nelson, Ed. *The Elections of 1992* (Washington D.C.: Congress Quarterly Inc., 1993).
- Road to the Presidency: Inside the Clinton Campaign* (Chicago: Subtle Communications, 1992).
- Sigelman, Lee and Pamela Johnston Conover. "The Dynamics of Presidential Support during International Conflict Situations: The Iranian Hostage Crisis." *Political Behavior* Vol. 3, No. 4 (1981): 303-318.
- Tenpas, Kathryn Dunn. "Campaigning to Govern: Presidents Seeking Reelection." *Political Science and Politics* Vol. 36, No. 2 (April, 2003): 199-202.

"The Persian Gulf War." *Pearson Education, Inc.* (2007).

<<http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001293.html>> (7 November 2007).

"Top Trading Partners." *U.S. Census Bureau.* <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/>> (9 December 2007).

Wang, Yangming. "The Politics of U.S.-China Economics Relations: MFN, Constructive Engagement, and the Trade Issue Proper." *Asian Survey* Vol. 33, No. 5 (May, 1993): 441-462.

"William J. Clinton." *The White House.*

<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/bc42.html>> (30 October 2007).